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Abstract
A lack of  commonly accepted benchmarks for hedge fund performance has permitted hedge fund man-
agers  to  attribute to  skill  returns  that  may actually  accrue from market risk  factors  and illiquidity. 
Recent innovations in hedge fund replication permits us to estimate the extent of  this misattribution.  
Using an option-based model, we fnd evidence that hedge fund returns actually refect the value of 
liquidity options that investors grant managers at below market values.  Coupled with the competition 
from hedge fund replication vehicles, this analysis may motivate hedge fund managers to relax their 
redemption terms.
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Introduction
Good investments outperform relevant benchmarks.  Thanks to Treynor (1965), Sharpe (1966), and 
Jensen (1969), who pioneered that feld of  study decades ago, investors in conventional assets have well  
established means of  testing the hypothesis that truism implies.  Largely because of  their work, investors 
in equity mutual funds compare their results to investible performance indices of  the markets in which 
their funds invest.  Research by Markowitz (1953), Tobin (1958), and Sharpe (1964) established compar-
able paradigms for fxed income investments.  As a result, bond investors measure nominal returns 
against historic term and risk premia, and real returns against infation.
Alternative assets lack well-defned and widely accepted performance benchmarks.  Consider hedge 
funds.  The many indices that track hedge fund performance suffer a common set of  problems that lim-
its their utility as standards of  performance.  These include survivor and backfll biases in databases,  a  
lack of  consensus on classifcation, and the inability to invest in an index proxy.  This paper argues that  
the recent growth of  investible factor-based hedge fund replication vehicles begins to solve this problem. 
It also claims that the liquidity of  such vehicles creates a framework for quantifying the price of  hedge 
fund illiquidity. 
Decomposing Hedge Fund Returns
In the absence of  a consensus on accurate benchmarks for hedge funds, most consultants and profes-
sional allocators have limited their correlation analysis to broad long-only benchmarks such as equity 
indices.  This has allowed hedge fund managers to claim that returns not correlated with these broad 
indices constitute evidence of  their skill.  They defne these idiosyncratic returns as alpha.
Recent developments may alter standards for analyzing hedge fund returns, at least for some hedge 
fund strategies.  For years, some analysts have reported and some investors have recognized the mag-
nitude of  hedge fund returns attributable to measurable risk factor exposures.  Brown and Goetzmann 
(2001), Fung & Hseih (1997, 2000, 2004), Al-Sharkas (2005) and others have documented this extens-
ively.  Often called exotic beta, hedge fund beta or something similar, these statistical artifacts have served 
to date primarily as measures of  correlation that true believers shun in a quixotic quest for the elusive  
alpha particle that allegedly shares the same subatomic return space.
At the most general level then, hedge fund returns comprise some idiosyncratic returns, some known 
and measurable returns, and some other “stuff ” that in a linear regression of  hedge fund returns and  
risk factors appears as statistical noise.  
For a single hedge fund, we may describe this more formally as
R f= fB f X T
f
                                                           (1)
where
B f=[1
f 2
f ⋯ n
f ]                                                                                                      (2)
and
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X T=[ X T
1 X T
2 ⋯ X T
n ]                                                          (3)
In words, the returns of  a hedge fund comprise its uncorrelated non-random returns, the correla tion-
weighted non-random returns of  n known risk factors computed over time period T, and some random 
returns.  The correlations B f  apply only to the specifc fund f while the regressors XT represent the 
returns of  a single set of  risk factors to which all funds may exhibit sensitivity.  In any period, correla-
tion coeffcients or regressors may hold positive or negative values.  In terms of  expectations, however, 
the standard linear regression model requires that the expected value of  the random returns equal zero.
The regression described above produces estimates of  a fund's  f  and B f  from time t = 0 to time 
t = T.  Conventionally, one would interpret B f as a measure of  the correlation of  returns attributable 
to  known  variables;  f0 would  indicate  that  the  manager  has  demonstrated  some  skill,  and
 f0 a lack thereof.  A skeptic may question the assertion that positive alpha equals skill because it 
may simply correspond to risk factors excluded from the regression.  Such a claim may overstate a man-
ager's insight, and undervalue its portfolio management skills which determined its risk factor exposure. 
Using this information to establish a benchmark holds more promise for fund evaluation.  It requires 
only a small but subtly different interpretation of  the regression results.  From this perspective, we con-
sider the quantity  B f X T a return available from known risk factors and, as such, a benchmark for 
the period from 0 to T.  To observe the over or under-performance of  the fund, we rearrange (1) to ob-
tain
 T
fT
f=RT
f−B f X T                                                         (4)
We measure the difference between the return of  the fund and the benchmark only in terms of  its ran -
dom and non-random components.  We do not defne any of  it as skill, or a lack thereof, because true  
skill encompasses the ability to manage a portfolio's risk factor allocation as well as its idiosyncratic se-
curity selection.  Since E [T
f ]=0 , a fund outperforms its benchmark only when T
f0 or
RT
fB f X T                                                                 (5)
 
Using such a proxy as a benchmark for the correlated portion of  a fund's expected return establishes it  
as a foor on the minimum return an investor should expect from a fund over a time period of  length T. 
In practice, this approach still has only limited value because most individual funds exhibit low correla-
tions with risk factors.  Moreover fund-specifc benchmarks do not permit us to compare funds fairly 
with each other.
Constructing Strategy Benchmarks with Risk Factors
In their efforts to avoid correlation with known betas, hedge fund analysts and investors have used re-
gression primarily to estimate correlation while overlooking the possibility of  using the identifable com-
ponents of  fund returns as benchmarks.  Until recently, they may have done so as well because one  
could not invest directly in many of  the risk factors identifed in regression analyses of  hedge fund re-
turns.  Absent the ability to invest in risk factors correlated with hedge fund returns, analysts reasonably 
declined to cite them as benchmarks for hedge fund performance.
05/20/11 Page 4 of  16
By themselves, even investible risk factor proxies function poorly as benchmarks.  Comparing hedge 
fund returns to those of  multiple risk factors creates a one-to-many relationship between a hedge fund  
and a set of  risk factor proxies.  Knowing a fund's correlations with a range of  risk factors tells us some-
thing about its historic exposures but little, in aggregate, about its performance relative to its peers.  Un-
fortunately, such analysis adds more confusion than insight to the process of  performance assessment.
Bundling risk factor allocations according to their degree of  correlation with large universes of  hedge 
funds mitigates this problem to a signifcant extent.  The recent proliferation of  listed ETFs, ETNs and 
futures contracts has expanded the universe of  investible risk factor proxies and accordingly reduced the 
constraint  on  using  them  to  construct  legitimate  benchmarks  for  hedge  fund  returns.   Following 
Hasanhodzic & Lo (2007), we may construct such a benchmark from investible risk factor proxies by 
weighting them by their correlation with the fund's returns over a specifed period. 
Risk Factor Correlation at the Strategy Level 
We characterize funds with similar correlations to common sets of  risk factors as hedge fund strategies.  
Applying the same regression methodology described above to such strategy universes produces robust 
correlations for most of  the major categories into which we tend to classify hedge funds.  For clarity, we 
rewrite the equations above with slightly different notation.  The regression becomes
                                                                   Rs=sBs X T
s
                                                          (6)
where
Bs=[1
s 2
s ⋯ n
s ]                                                                                                  (7)
While identical to (1) and (2) but for a change in notation, the results of  this regression require a differ-
ent interpretation from that given for (1).  The regression results
         
Bs=[ 1
s 2
s ⋯ n
s ]
                                                                                                  (8)
quantify the average exposure of  all funds in the universe to a common set of  risk factors.  As such, they 
identify the factors that dominate the aggregate behavior of  the funds in the universe of  similar funds.  
At the same time, they highlight the insignifcance to the universe as a whole of  factors that may explain 
a lot of  the behavior of  only a few of  the funds in the universe.
                                                                           
We measure the goodness-of-ft of  a regression, roughly the percentage of  the behavior of  strategy re-
turns Rs  explained by the risk factors Bs X T , by its so-called R-square coeffcient.  The following 
table shows the R-square values of  regressions of  returns of  some major hedge fund strategies against 
baskets of  investible risk factor proxies.
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Hedge Fund Strategy1 R-square2
Long/Short Equity North America 95%
Event Equity 89%
Long/Short Equity Emerging Markets 84%
Distressed Investment 79%
Credit Strategies 78%
Convertible Bond Arbitrage 62%
Market Neutral Equity 58%
Directional Macro 55%
Statistical Arbitrage 53%
CTAs 34%
Volatility Arbitrage 13%
  
The data suggests clearly that portfolios of  risk factor proxies explain signifcant percentages of  the re-
turns of  some strategies, and insignifcant portions of  others.  Funds in strategies with high correlations 
to investible risk factors tend to have two characteristics in common: an concentration on corporate se-
curities and a low rate of  monthly portfolio turnover.  In general, we observe that long/short equity and 
corporate credit strategies exhibit  high correlations with investible risk factors.  In contrast,  relative 
value and arbitrage strategies, especially those focused on interest rates and foreign exchange, and those 
with rapid turnover such as Directional Macro and Statistical Arbitrage, exhibit much less correlation 
with such instruments.
For highly correlated strategies then, we claim that investible portfolios of  correlation-weighted risk 
factor proxies constitute ex post benchmarks for signifcant percentages of  the relevant strategies' expec-
ted returns.  Specifcally, to the extent that a strategy's aggregate beta Bs X T  accounts for a relatively 
stable percentage of  its returns over time, a time series of  returns of  a portfolio designed to mimic that  
beta constitutes a lower bound on the performance one might have reasonably expected to earn from in-
vestments in that strategy over that period.
Using Replication Benchmarks to Price Hedge Fund Liquidity
Accounting for the explanatory variables of  a regression of  strategy level returns still leaves us without 
an explanation for the s , i.e. the non-random portion of  the strategy returns not correlated with 
known risk factors.  Clearly it does not describe skill since we cannot apply such a concept in the aggreg-
ate, a point that should raise questions about its use for that purpose at the fund level.  Excluding skill as  
a possible meaning for s requires us to develop alternative explanations for it.  By defnition, we 
know that it may simply refer to unidentifed risk factors not included among the  XT.  Until we can 
identify them, we cannot incorporate them into the benchmark.  No investible risk factor proxy exists 
for s .  An insight into the features of  an investible benchmark suggests a more tangible and signifc-
ant alternative.
By their construction, factor-based replication funds lack the ability to generate  alpha.  Unlike hedge 
1 The authors have classifed funds in the hedgefund.net™ database into the listed strategies based on the commonality of 
their risk factor correlations. 
2 Based on regressions of  monthly performance for all funds in the universes for any consecutive twelve month period 
from January 2, 1999 through March 31, 2011.
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funds, they can explain 100% of  their returns at all times in terms of  the performance of  the risk factor  
proxies in which they invest.  They differ from the hedge funds whose strategies they attempt to mimic  
in other ways as well.  Specifcally, they can offer investors daily mark-to-market transparency and li-
quidity.  A large investor in a replication fund that invests only in listed ETFs, ETNs, and futures con-
tracts, for example, can close out such an investment in no more than a few hours.  Smaller ones can 
convert their investments to cash in a matter of  minutes.
In contrast, few hedge funds offer their investors even monthly liquidity.  Most offer quarterly liquidity 
with signifcant notice periods.  Some place even stricter limits on withdrawals.  Many impose lockup 
periods of  one or more years on new investments.  Some permit “early” redemptions only with the pay-
ment of  an exit fee.  At the same time managers retain the right to return capital to investors at any  
time.
Chacko (2005) fnds evidence that liquidity premia account for statistically signifcant portions of  re-
turns of  corporate bonds.  In his analysis, he introduces a concept of  latent liquidity or accessibility that de-
pends essentially on the willingness of  bond holders to sell, what one might also call behavioral liquidity. 
In contrast, this paper examines  contractual liquidity between a hedge fund investor and a hedge fund 
manager.  To reconcile these two phenomena, we recognize behavior as a contract with oneself.  For ex-
ample, an insurance company with an investment policy that limits reviews of  holdings to quarterly 
periods has essentially imposed on itself  a policy of  quarterly liquidity.   
The obvious differences in liquidity between factor-based replication funds and hedge funds suggest 
that a liquidity premium accounts for at least some portion of s , the excess returns observed at the 
strategy level.  Surely a hedge fund investor subject to limited liquidity should earn more than an in-
vestor in a fund with more frequent liquidity that replicates only that hedge fund's known risk factors. 
Excess returns s observed at the strategy level then should include both idiosyncratic performance 
and compensation for the liquidity that hedge fund investors forego relative to investors in replication 
funds.
Chacko, Das & Fan (2011) model ex post behavioral illiquidity as a sum of  two American options, one 
call and one put.  To answer the  ex ante question of  how much of  a liquidity premium an investor 
should expect to earn in exchange for entering into a contract that limits liquidity for the convenience of 
a hedge fund manager, we present a similar option-based model similar to those of  Longstaff  (1995) 
and Koziol & Sauerbier (2007)  that contrasts  the quasi-continuous liquidity of  equity markets with 
scheduled liquidity of  hedge funds.  Like Longstaff  and Koziol & Sauerbier, our model posits a per -
fectly liquid proxy against which we compare an identical asset with intermittent liquidity. 
Continuous liquidity in a replication fund corresponds to the right to sell the fund at any time.  In op -
tion terms we may describe this as the right to put the replication fund back to the market continuously.  
Mathematically we may express this value as a sum of  an infnite series of  at-the-money put options of  
infnitesimal duration3.  Let s represent the value of  continuous liquidity available to a replication 
fund investor.
s=∫0
∞
P s t                                                           (9)
3 Appendix A contains a detailed explanation of  the theory that allows us to estimate liquidity premia with option prices.
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Evaluating this integral lies beyond the scope of  this paper.  Fortunately, we know from elementary cal-
culus that it equals or exceeds the value of  a sum of  discrete at-the-money options of  measurable dura-
tion, i.e. 
∫0
∞
P s t ≥∑
t=0
T
P st                                                         (10)
We will use the right hand term of  this equation to estimate the value of  the liquidity of  a replication 
fund offering daily liquidity.
In contrast to the replication fund, we may value the periodic liquidity of  a hedge fund as a single  
European put option expiring on the fund's redemption date.  We let  f represent the value of  this 
option ex ante, i.e. at the time of  investment.
 f=P f T                                                               (11)
We cannot know ex ante the true at-the-money strike price of  this option because we cannot know the 
value of  the fund at time T.  If  we believe, however, that funds are proftable more often than not, then 
we may assume that an at-the-money put struck at the inception of  an investment period will be at least  
slightly out of  the money on most redemption dates.  Thus  f  will underestimate slightly the ex post 
value  f if  we value it as an at-the-money put option struck at the beginning of  an investment period 
that expires on the redemption date allowed by the fund.
 f≤  f=P f T                                                           (12)
Thus the actual put option an investor holds at the end of  an investment period has more value than  
that implied by an at-the-money put struck at the beginning on an investment period.  Since the same 
logic applies to the values of  the replication fund's continuous puts of  infnitesimal duration, i.e. their  
true strike price actually changes with an upward bias over time, this has no meaningful effect on the 
analysis. 
To estimate the value of  the liquidity denied by a hedge fund with liquidity available only at time T in 
comparison to that of  a replication fund offering continuous liquidity, we simply take the ex ante differ-
ence between the two option values. 
T=s− f=∑
t=0
T
P s t −P f T                                             (13) 
This expression captures the effect of  an investor exchanging daily liquidity for a single fxed redemp-
tion date.
Estimated Values of  Hedge Fund Illiquidity  
We use the standard discrete Black-Scholes option pricing model to price European puts of  different 
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durations.  To value the sum of  one day at the money puts, we discount each one by the appropriate 
forward rate so as not to overstate the combined value of  the puts.  Of  course the term put P f T   
requires only a single straight-forward calculation.  The model produces some startling results when one 
compares the value of  daily liquidity to that of  almost any other term.  They appear considerably more 
reasonable when one compares longer redemption periods to each other.  Signifcantly, our results re-
semble those of  Longstaff  (1995) who commented in his paper that “discounts for lack of  marketability 
can be large even when the length of  the marketability restriction is very short.”4
To compare different liquidity regimes, we compare different liquidity preferences with different liquid-
ity profles.  For example, we compute the value to an investor seeking monthly liquidity of  investments 
with quarterly and annual liquidity.  This approach allows us to map the liquidity premia that investors 
should demand for investments that exceed their preferred liquidity.
We assume annualized volatility of  8% for both funds, a number similar to the long-term level observed 
for funds that replicate the performance of  US-focused long/short equity hedge funds, and an annual 
risk-free rate of  2%, a more realistic estimate than that imposed by current Fed policy.  Because liquid-
ity premia vary directly with volatility and inversely with the risk-free rates, investors should demand 
higher liquidity premia for more volatile assets with equal volatility and accept lower ones from all assets 
in higher interest rate environments.
Yield Compensation for Less-than-preferred Liquidity
% per deferral 
period
Preferred Liquidity
Daily Weekly Monthly Quarterly Semi-Annual Annual 
A
ct
u
al
   
   
  
L
iq
u
id
it
y 
   
  Daily 0
Weekly 0.73% 0
Monthly 4.10% 0.98% 0
Quarterly 13.60% 4.15% 1.18% 0
Semi-Annual 28.12% 9.22% 3.28% 0.93% 0
Annual 57.71% 19.79% 7.89% 3.16% 1.30% 0
As a caveat, we recognize that the extreme sensitivity of  option prices to volatility means that hedge  
funds could justify their restrictive redemption terms easily if  they needed to compare their perform-
ance only to more liquid investments with much lower volatility.  For example, an investor would be in-
different between an investment with continuous liquidity and an annualized volatility of  just over 0.8% 
and a hedge fund with quarterly liquidity and an annualized volatility of  8%.  That does not apply, 
however, to investible hedge fund replication strategies with volatilities similar to those of  hedge funds 
themselves.  In general, the volatility differentials required to equate typical hedge fund  redemption 
terms with far more liquid alternatives exceed by far those available to investors today.  In other words, 
investors have available to them many investment options with risk-return profles similar to those of 
hedge funds that offer far more attractive liquidity than hedge funds.   
To conclude, the incremental return required to make an investor indifferent between two investments  
that differ signifcantly only in their liquidity terms seems reasonable when one compares, for example,  
quarterly to annual liquidity.  The extreme differences between the value of  daily liquidity and any oth-
er term raises, however, serious questions about the practice of  funds offering less liquidity than those of 
4 Longstaff  (1995), pg. 1768.
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the assets in which the invest.  Specifcally, with respect to the primary topic of  this article,  funds that  
replicate hedge fund returns, these results raise serious questions about the restrictions managers place 
on redemptions relative to the s they appear to generate at the strategy level, and by implication the
 f they produce individually.                                  
Conclusions
The contrasting results of  risk factor regressions on individual funds and on collections of  funds classi-
fed as “strategies” force hedge fund investors to assess their commitment to the paradigm of  strategy 
classifcation of  hedge funds.  An investor who views hedge funds as unique investment vehicles for  
which strategy classifcations serve merely an accounting function may discount the value of  bundles of  
risk factor proxies.  In contrast, an investor who acknowledges that strategy classifcations properly re-
fect similarities in the behavior of  many hedge funds may embrace the notion of  factor-based replica-
tion vehicles as benchmarks for their allocations to the corresponding hedge fund strategies.
Recognizing factor-based replication funds as legitimate benchmarks permits us to view the uncorrel-
ated  non-random portion  of  strategy  level  returns  as  a  proxy  for  differences  in  liquidity  between 
replication funds, and the funds whose correlated non-random returns they emulate.  Using an option 
model, we observe that daily liquidity has a value far in excess of  any excess returns one might expect to 
earn from most hedge funds with limited liquidity.
These results suggest that hedge fund managers in strategies that investors can emulate to a signifcant 
extent with more liquid alternatives may need to relax their redemption terms as replication funds grow 
in popularity.  More signifcantly, it implies that most hedge fund returns come not from manager skill 
but from the value of  options that investors, when they invest in a hedge fund, “sell” implicitly to fund 
managers at prices far below their market values. 
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Appendix A
Deriving Liquidity Premia from Option Prices
Since the arrival of  the Black-Scholes option pricing model (1975), practitioners of  academic and ap-
plied fnance have focused their research on volatility and on the effects of  irregular cash fows.  Invari -
ably they have viewed time, one of  the fve variables required to price options, as given, or, in comparing 
option prices for different assets, as equal for each asset.
In this paper we argue that an investment manager may only claim to have produced excess returns 
over a benchmark after compensating investors for any differences in liquidity between the managed as-
set and the benchmark. The main body of  the paper contains the argument for treating an investible 
replication fund as a benchmark but presents only an abridged justifcation for using the option pricing 
model to evaluate the differences in liquidity between a benchmark fund and a hedge fund to for which 
it serves as a reference.  This appendix contains a more complete explanation of  this approach. 
To begin, we invert the normal representation of  options as derivatives of  some fnancial asset.  We ar -
gue, instead, that fnancial assets themselves lack inherent existence.  Instead they derive their value 
from continuous series of  at-the-money options on the real assets whose values they embody.  From this  
perspective, we observe that an exchange-traded equity, for example, comprises an infnite series of  at-
the-money calls and puts on some real assets.  Stock is merely a name that we impute to this collection of 
options.  We defne this phenomenon as follows:
Defnition 1: A fnancial asset comprises infnite series of  at-the-money calls and puts of  infnitesimal duration.  All  
such series have lower bounds of  t=0.  Series for assets with fnal maturity dates have upper bounds of  t=T; series for as -
sets without a fnal maturity date have no upper bound.
Formally we may describe the unbounded scenario with the equation
S=∫
0
∞
C t ∫
0
∞
P t                                                          (A1)
Most readers will see instantly how the right of  an owner of  a share of  stock to sell it at any time corres-
ponds to a continuous series of  at-the-money put options; but where, one may wonder, are the call op-
tions?  To see this we introduce two rules: the long rule and the short rule.
Long Rule: A long position in a fnancial asset remains a long position until and unless the owner exercises one of  the  
infnite series of  put options available to terminate the long exposure.  Such put options may be available continuously or  
intermittently.  The asset owner implicitly exercises each of  the infnite series of  calls at every moment that it does not  
choose to exercise a put to negate the long exposure.
Short Rule: A short position in a fnancial asset remains a short position until and unless the owner exercises one of  the 
infnite series of  call options available to terminate the short exposure.  Such call options may be available continuously or  
intermittently.  The holder of  the short position implicitly exercises each of  the infnite series of  puts at every moment that  
it does not choose to exercise a call to negate the short exposure.
We may incorporate these rules into Defnition 1 to defne long and short positions in terms of  the 
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characteristics of  the options they comprise.
Defnition 1a: A long position in a fnancial asset comprises an infnite series of  at-the-money call options of  infnites-
imal duration and put options of  infnitesimal or intermittent duration with the call options deemed exercised automatically  
unless the holder exercises one of  the put options to liquidate the position.
Defnition 1b: A short position in a fnancial asset comprises an infnite series of  at-the-money put options of  infn-
itesimal duration and call options of  infnitesimal or intermittent duration with the put options deemed exercised automatic -
ally unless the holder exercises one of  the call options to cover the position.
From this perspective, both owners and short sellers of  assets buy options continuously.  Long holders 
pay their option premia implicitly with a combination of  the foregone interest on the cash paid for the  
asset, and some portion of  its future returns.  Ceteris paribus, a long position has a gain when
S tX t0                                                          (A2)
where S equals the market price of  the real assets underlying the options at time t , X the strike 
price of  the at-the-money options at time  t,  the proft on the position and  , an infnitesimal 
amount of  time past t.  Similarly
S tX t0                                                           (A3)
Clearly the reverse conditions apply to short positions.  Thus in this paradigm, returns on fnancial as -
sets equal the aggregate differences between the value of  all the options they comprise from the time 
one acquires them (or establishes a short position in them), and the cost of  those options that expire 
while one owns them (or maintains a short position in them).
To apply this analysis to the benchmarking example at issue in this paper, we let S b represent the 
price of  the benchmark replication fund and S f the price of  a hedge fund claiming to offer returns in 
excess of  the benchmark.  Because the volatility of  the investible benchmark, and the funds it references 
should be similar, we assume that only redemption terms differentiate S b from S f  with the former 
offering continuous liquidity and the latter liquidity only on a specifc date T.  Then following (A1) we 
may describe the price of  the benchmark fund with the following equation.
S b=∫
0
∞
C t ∫
0
∞
P t =∫
0
∞
C t ∫
0
T
P t  ∫
T
∞
P t                                (A4)
We describe the hedge fund in equation (A5).
S f=∫
0
∞
C t P T ∫
T
∞
P t L
T                                                (A5)
where L
T represents the value of  the liquidity differential between a long position in a benchmark 
with continuous liquidity and the hedge fund that offers liquidity initially only at time T.  For the hedge 
fund to perform at least as well as its benchmark, we must have
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S f≥S b S f−S b≥0                                                          (A6)
Substituting (A4) and (A5) into (A6) and simplifying the resulting equation produces
∫0
T
P t −P T − L
T≥0                                                       (A7)
L
T≥∫0
T
P t −P T                                                           (A8)
Thus the liquidity premium for a long asset with continuous liquidity over an identical asset with re-
demption available only at time T equals the value of  the continuous infnitesimal at-the-money put op-
tions expiring from inception of  the position until time T less the value of  a single European put option 
expiring at time T.  
A similar analysis comparing a short asset with continuous liquidity with another short asset offering 
only a single opportunity to cover the short produces a value derived from option prices of
S
T=∫
0
T
C t −C T                                                     (A9)
The liquidity valuation hypothesis assumes only that the hedge fund's volatility equals that of  its bench-
mark.  To analyze the hypothesis, we compare at-the-money European put option prices on the  bench-
mark fund and the hedge fund that differ only by their expiration schedules, i.e. the variable of  time.
We examined the benchmark asset under two scenarios: as a standalone entity with continuous liquid-
ity; and as a benchmark embedded in an asset such as a hedge fund.  In using the Black-Scholes option 
model to price the liquidity of  each scenario, we differentiated between them only by using times until  
expiration.  To make the option prices equivalent to percentage values, we set both the underlying price 
and the exercise price at 100.  We used a constant volatility of  8% slightly more than that of  the ten  
year historical level of  the benchmark derived from a back test of  hedge fund data.  We set the risk-free 
rate at 2%, a more historically reasonable level than that of  the post-2008 central bank regime.
Because these two calculations produce different results, and because differences in permissible times for 
execution correspond to different liquidity profles, we interpret price differences between options res-
ulting exclusively from differences in the time variable of  the option pricing model as reasonable estim-
ates of  the relative value of  the differences in liquidity schedules.
In analyzing the benchmarking example in this paper, we have assumed that the volatility of  the bench-
mark equals that of  the assets to which one would compare it.  While this makes sense in the hedge  
fund example, it need not be true in general.  This approach to pricing liquidity should apply to assets 
that differ in both the frequency with which they trade and in volatility.  As we mentioned in the body of 
the paper, the values of  liquidity differentials shrink dramatically when one compares liquid assets with 
low volatility to illiquid ones with high volatility.  In the context of  hedge funds and the emerging mar-
ket for investible benchmarks, however, such differences in volatility exceed by far the levels required to 
justify the limited liquidity most hedge funds offer their investors. 
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